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Abstract 41 
Understanding how container routing stands to be impacted by different scenarios of liner shipping 42 
network perturbations such as natural disasters or new major infrastructure developments is of key 43 
importance for decision-making in the liner shipping industry.  The variety of actors and processes 44 
within modern supply chains and the complexity of their relationships have previously led to the 45 
development of simulation-based models, whose application has been largely compromised by their 46 
dependency on extensive and often confidential sets of data. This study proposes the application of 47 
optimisation techniques less dependent on complex data sets in order to develop a quantitative 48 
framework to assess the impacts of disruptive events on liner shipping networks. We provide a 49 
categorization of liner network perturbations, differentiating between systemic and external and 50 
formulate a container assignment model that minimises routing costs extending previous 51 
implementations to allow feasible solutions when routing capacity is reduced below transport demand. 52 
We develop a base case network for the Southeast Asia to Europe liner shipping trade and review of 53 
accidents related to port disruptions for two scenarios of seismic and political conflict hazards. 54 
Numerical results identify alternative routing paths and costs in the aftermath of port disruptions 55 
scenarios and suggest higher vulnerability of intra-regional connectivity. 56 
 57 
Keywords: Liner shipping; Network perturbations; Port disruption accidents, Container assignment 58 
model 59 
  60 
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1 Introduction 61 
While the effects of market cycles (Stopford, 2009) on the overall stability of liner shipping networks 62 
have been the subject of extensive research over the years, what is less known is how the overall liner 63 
shipping transport system can be affected by perturbations to the established network topology caused 64 
by events such as infrastructure developments, natural disasters or armed conflicts. These perturbations 65 
are important because they could significantly alter transportation capabilities between regions or result 66 
in accidents that can cause loss of life, injuries, economic loss or damage to the environment (Mullai 67 
and Paulsson, 2011). Therefore, understanding the impact of liner shipping perturbations on container 68 
cargo routing and their potential related accidents is crucial for decision-makers in the maritime industry 69 
who strive at being better prepare for these events.  70 
It is unrealistic to expect remove all uncertainty related to the potential effects of the above-71 
mentioned events. However, this uncertainty can be reduced applying quantitative frameworks that 72 
model container routing under hypothetical scenarios of network perturbations and examining historical 73 
records of accidents related to the events evaluated. Such frameworks, however, are not simple to 74 
formulate. The variety of actors and processes within modern supply chains, and the complexity of their 75 
relationships have previously led to the development of simulation-based container models whose, 76 
application have been largely compromised by their dependency on extensive and complex sets of data 77 
which are generally not available in a many cases and regions. 78 
One of the earliest attempts to simulate maritime container flows at a global scale was the 79 
Container World project (Newton, 2008; Bell et al., 2011). This study proposed a simulation approach 80 
in which every ship, port, liner service, shipping line, truck and rail operator was represented by a 81 
separate agent. The network was built using actual port rotations published by ocean carriers. 82 
Containers were transported via each of the agents operating based on their individual set of parameters. 83 
Although the model provided a framework for global-scale container routing, it proved to be too data 84 
intensive in an competitive industry reluctant to share the data required to maintain the model (Bell et 85 
al., 2011). This limitation hampers the application of such model for scenario analysis in regions where 86 
the required data is not available. 87 
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Alternative research efforts have focused on the development of optimisation-based models that 88 
can operate with simpler datasets yet are capable of delivering reliable results using computationally 89 
efficient mathematical programs. The network used in these models can be built from published ocean 90 
carrier schedules (Zurheide and Fischer, 2012) or computed from a liner shipping network design 91 
problem (Agarwal and Ergun, 2008). The objectives in the optimisation-based literature range between 92 
minimisation of routing costs (Wang et al., 2013), minimisation of sailing time (Bell et al., 2011), 93 
maximisation of profit from an ocean carrier point of view (Ting and Tzeng, 2004) and maximisation 94 
of volumes transported (Song et al., 2005). Tran and Haasis (2013) provide a comprehensive review of 95 
previous optimisation-based works including additional relevant features such as empty container 96 
repositioning, deterministic or stochastic shipping demand, and container routing problems in time 97 
extended networks.  98 
This study seeks to contribute to the application of optimisation-based models for the analysis of 99 
liner shipping cargo flows affected by network perturbations, building upon earlier work by Bell et al. 100 
(2013) on cost-based container assignment. The proposed application of this model minimises expected 101 
container routing costs in order to assess changes in container cargo flows under scenarios of seismic 102 
and conflict hazards affecting the Southeast Asia to Europe trades. We examine previous studies of past 103 
similar disruptions in order to discuss their potential related accidents and network parameters affected 104 
in the aftermath of the disruption scenarios presented.  105 
The cost-based assignment model has a series of features that make it suitable for the requirements 106 
of this study: First, the cost dimension is used to model the distribution of flows and aggregates a range 107 
of dependencies such as container handling and rental cost, cargo depreciation, and transit time. As 108 
such it can be used to model possible variations in costs and times that occur on the aftermath of port 109 
disruptions. Second, it includes both port capacity and link capacity constraints that can capture 110 
disrupted operational parameters in liner shipping networks. Third, the model uses a virtual network 111 
approach (Jourquin et al., 2008) which provides an accurate representation of liner shipping operations 112 
and allows to skip disrupted ports within a established port call sequence. Finally, we extend previous 113 
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formulations adding a decision variable and penalty costs for cargo not transported allowing feasible 114 
solutions in cases where disruptions decrease network routing capacity below transport demands. 115 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology used by 116 
first proposing a classification scheme of network perturbations, differentiating between systemic and 117 
external. This section describes the cost-based assignment model that forms the core of the perturbation 118 
analysis framework. Section 3 provides a case-study focusing on the Southeast Asia to Europe trade 119 
where the model is applied in two scenarios of port disruption: seismic hazards and political conflicts. 120 
Lastly, section 4 presents conclusions and outlines future work. 121 
2 Methodology 122 
2.1 Classification scheme for liner shipping network perturbations 123 
We define “network perturbation” as any change, positive or negative, to the existing state of main 124 
components of liner shipping networks. These include ports (nodes), routes operated by container liner 125 
services (links), vessels size (capacity), and transport demands (origin-destination pairs). Whether a 126 
perturbation is positive or negative often depends on the point of view of each stake holder. For 127 
example, the 1995 Port of Kobe disruption caused by an earthquake diverted local cargo to the ports of 128 
Osaka, Nagoya and Yokohama and transhipment cargo to the ports of Busan and Kaohsiung improving 129 
their cargo volumes and business. Though the port of Kobe recovered and the local cargo returned, 130 
significant transhipment volumes never returned (Lam, 2012). Positive or negative perturbations 131 
impacts are not isolated to port disruptions. For example, the improvement of existing infrastructure 132 
such as the Panama Canal expansion scheduled for completion in 2016 will relax vessel deployment 133 
upper bound constraints through this waterway. Potential impacts include transshipment cargo shifting 134 
in the Caribbean area from ports without capacity to receive post-panamax vessels to those with 135 
adequate infrastructure to accommodate such vessels (Rodrigue and Ashar, 2015). 136 
In order to identify in which scenarios a container routing model can provide a contribution to the 137 
analysis of network perturbations, we proposed a classification scheme which differentiates between 138 
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systemic and external perturbations. This differentiation allows to identify sources of disruptions which, 139 
from a modelling stand-point, dictate the main parameters of the network that will be modified.  140 
Previous studies have focused on the study of maritime supply chains risk with a focus on port 141 
disruptions (e.g. Lam, 2012; Loh and Van Thai, 2014; Mansouri et al., 2010; Qi, 2015). However, this 142 
initial non-exhaustive taxonomy is, to the best of our knowledge, the first attempt to classify 143 
perturbations that impact additional liner shipping network components beyond ports as focal point 144 
such as route capacity and factors influencing origins and destinations of containerised cargo. Our 145 
proposed classification adapts macroeconomic, operational and competitive factors discussed by 146 
Rodrigue (2010) to include perturbations derived from the liner shipping industry while additional 147 
environmental and human risk factors are used to capture exogenous perturbations. 148 
Figure 2.1 presents and hierarchical representation of the proposed classification with examples of 149 
liner network perturbations. Systemic perturbations refer to changes that are intrinsic to the liner 150 
shipping industry. These are mainly driven by macroeconomic factors that impact supply and demand 151 
of containerized trade; operational factors such regulatory restrictions and industry practices such as 152 
“cascade” effects of larger containerships; and competitive factors such as the development of new 153 
infrastructure (e.g. London Gateway port). External perturbations refer to changes driven by exogenous 154 
factors to the liner shipping industry. These include environmental changes such as the potential use of 155 
arctic shipping routes and natural disasters such as earthquakes; and human risk factors such as port 156 
labour strikes, piracy and political conflicts. 157 
Some of the perturbations shown in Figure 2.1 can be categorised under more than one of the 158 
proposed factors due to existing underlying relationships. For example, though “vessel cascade” is an 159 
operational measure driven by the increased use of economies of scale, the use of larger containerships 160 
is also the result of increased demand volumes (macroeconomic factor) and ocean carriers’ strategy to 161 
reduce their transportation costs (competitive factor). 162 
 163 
P. Achurra-Gonzalez, M. Novati, R. Foulser-Piggott, D.J. Graham, G. Bowman, M.G.H. Bell, P. Angeloudis     7 
 
 
 
 164 
Figure 2.1: Classification scheme for liner shipping network perturbations. 165 
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Perturbation scenarios evaluated in this study focus on two cases of port disruptions caused by 167 
seismic hazards and political conflicts assuming that in both cases the pertubartions are inevitable. The 168 
scenarios were selected in collaboration with the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies1 due to their 169 
relevance to Southeast Asia as a major production of containerised goods and illustrate potential 170 
disruptive effects of environmental and human risk factors (external perturbations) on regional 171 
transshipment hubs and trade partner regions such as Europe. The port disruption cases stand to affect 172 
the examined port network in different ways including being the root cause for marine accidents, the 173 
characteristics of which are illustrated sections 3.1 and 3.2 for the earthquake and political conflict 174 
scenario respectively. 175 
Port disruptions cases were also selected because they are a common cause of network 176 
perturbations and the necessary data for modelling their impact (e.g. recovery time and effects on 177 
terminal operability) is often publicly available in historical records. Root-causes for port disruptions 178 
such as an earthquake or a tsunami can also offset existing safety plans in port operations leading to 179 
greater number of accidents. Previous works have discussed the impact of port disruptions from risk 180 
sources other than natural disasters and political conflicts including labour strikes, equipment failure, 181 
human errors and terrorist attacks (Lam and Yip, 2012; Lewis et al., 2013; Mansouri et al., 2010). Table 182 
2.1 includes a list of various examples of port disruptions that occurred between January 2012 and 183 
January 2014 (Qi, 2015) in order to illustrate the vulnerability of the liner shipping industry to these 184 
events. For comprehensive reviews of port-centric disruptions affecting maritime supply chains we refer 185 
to Lam (2012) and Loh and Van Thai (2014). Similarly, detailed reviews of sources of accidents and 186 
incidence in container shipping operations can be found in Fabiano et al. (2010). 187 
                                                 
 
1 http://www.risk.jbs.cam.ac.uk/ 
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Table 2.1: Examples of port disruptions in recent years. Source: Qi (2015). 188 
Date Event Port Consequences 
Jan-2012 High winds Felixstowe and South 
Hampton 
Disruptions in services at the two 
largest container hubs in the UK. 
Feb-2012 Shipping pilots' 
strike  
Antwerp MSC container services affected over 
21 vessels. 
Nov-2012 Hurricane New York/New Jersey Container terminal operations closed. 
Mar-2013 40-day port 
labour strike 
Hong Kong Reduced dock capacity by 20%, vessels 
delayed by 2-4 days and some vessels 
skipping port calls at Hong Kong 
Sep-2013 Failure of a quay 
crane's gearbox 
Botany (DP World 
Terminal) 
Sudden and unforeseen vessel slot 
cancelations. 
Jan-2014 Snow storms New York/New Jersey Port closure multiple times during and 
after the storm resulting in 7-10 delays 
to deliveries. 
 189 
2.2 Cost-based assignment model 190 
As indicated in section 1, in order to assess the effects of port disruptions, the network model considered 191 
in this study consist of the following container network concepts based on earlier work carried by Bell 192 
et al. (2013). 193 
- Routes: A scheduled sequence of port calls operated by a shipping line or alliance. Also known 194 
as liner service. 195 
- Links: A physical connection of adjacent pair of port calls served by a route.  196 
- Legs: A virtual transport task executed by a given route. 197 
- Paths: A chain of transport tasks or legs. 198 
 199 
The following assumptions and simplifications are adopted in the cost-based assignment model:  200 
- A single container type is considered, with a fixed set of daily rent and handling costs. This 201 
enables the aggregation of data on container flows and liner service capacities. 202 
- An exogenous origin-destination (O-D) matrix is used as demand input for the model. The rate 203 
at which containers are shipped does not vary with time. 204 
- Containers are transported by ocean carriers operating fixed liner service routes between ports.  205 
Liner services have fixed port call frequency but the arrival at each port is uncoordinated 206 
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between ships of different services. Hence, container dwell time at each port is assumed to be 207 
the inverse of the sum of the service frequencies at each port.  208 
- Route capacity constraints ensure that the flow of containers on each route does not exceed the 209 
capacity deployed by the ocean carrier. 210 
- Combined inbound and outbound flow at each port cannot exceed port throughput capacity.  211 
 212 
Our extension on the assignment model presented by Bell et al (2013) includes a penalty cost for 213 
each container not transported which allows feasible solutions for instances where the network transport 214 
capacity, either port throughput or liner service capacity, is not sufficient to satisfy the transport 215 
demand. This feature is desirable for a model capable of quantifying to what extent network 216 
perturbations hamper the network capability to re-route existing transport demand. 217 
 The penalty cost formulation requires an additional decision variable that dictates what cargo to 218 
route through the network from the given O-D matrix input. As such, penalty costs inputs for containers 219 
not transported must be higher than any routing costs alternatives to ensure that cargo flows are 220 
maximised when routing capacity is available.  221 
Other costs considered in the model are: container handling cost, container rental cost and 222 
inventory cost. Ship operating costs are considered fixed and do not affect the routing decision. In this 223 
application, only flows of loaded containers are considered. The repositioning of empty containers is 224 
excluded. The model is then formulated as the following linear program (see Appendix for notation): 225 
Objective 226 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑇𝑅𝐶 =   (∑ ∑ 𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑛
𝑎∈𝐴𝑛∈𝑁
𝑥𝑎+
𝑓 ) + (∑ 𝑥𝑎+
𝑓 𝑐𝑎
𝑎∈𝐴
+ 𝑤++
𝑓 ) (𝐶𝑅 + 𝐷𝑉)
+ (∑ ∑(𝐷𝑟𝑠 −
𝑠∈𝐷𝑟∈𝑂
𝑡𝑟𝑠
𝑓 )) (𝑃𝐶) 
(2.1) 
Subject to 227 
 
∑ 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓
𝑎∈𝐴𝑖
+
− ∑ 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓
𝑎∈𝐴𝑖
−
= 𝑏𝑖𝑠
𝑓    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷 
(2.2) 
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 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓 ≤  𝑤𝑖𝑠
𝑓𝑓𝑎    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑖
−, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑠 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷 (2.3) 
 
𝑘𝑖 ≥  ∑ 𝑥𝑎+
𝑓
𝑎∈𝐴𝑖
−
+ ∑ 𝑥𝑎+
𝑓
𝑎∈𝐴𝑖
+
  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 (2.4) 
 
𝑅𝐶𝑛 ≥  ∑ 𝑥𝑎+
𝑓
𝑎∈𝐴
δ𝑎𝑙𝑛   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝑛 , 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 (2.5) 
 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓 ≥ 0   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷 (2.6) 
 𝑏𝑖𝑠
𝑓
{
−𝑡𝑟𝑠
𝑓     𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑟 ∈ 𝑂 
𝑡+𝑠
𝑓     𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷
0      𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (2.7) 
 𝑡𝑟𝑠
𝑓 ≤ 𝑇𝐷𝑟𝑠   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟 ∈ 𝑂, 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷 (2.8) 
Objective function (2.1) minimizes total routing cost TRC which includes container handling cost 228 
on each leg, container rental and inventory cost as a function of the transit time and dwell time at each 229 
port and a penalty cost for each container not transported from the original O-D flow demand. 230 
Constraint (2.2) enforces flow conservation. Constraint (2.3) sets the container port dwell time as the 231 
inverse of the combined service frequencies of the liner services calling at each port. Constraint (2.4) 232 
and (2.5) ensure that port throughput and route capacity are not exceeded. The non-negativity constraint 233 
is included in (2.6). In (2.7), origin and destination constraints are included where, for transhipment 234 
ports, the inbound flow should equal outbound flow. Constraint (2.8) sets the amount of cargo 235 
transported to be less or equal to the O-D flow demand. 236 
Route capacity inputs for the model adapt a slot capacity analysis approach (Lam and Yap, 2011; 237 
Lam, 2011) but with a weekly time window instead of a annual basis. This approach is suitable for our 238 
analysis because it relies on publicly available slot capacity data of liner services which is accessible 239 
through most ocean carriers’ websites. Alternative approaches based on port-to-port container 240 
throughput differentiated by liner services would require commercially sensible data which will be 241 
difficult or impossible to obtain (Lam, 2011).  242 
We assume that ocean carriers determine the number of vessels to be deployed on each route n 243 
dividing the total voyage time (expressed in days) by the desired route frequency (e.g. weekly port 244 
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calls). This assumption is derived from the common industry practice of having weekly port calls in 245 
competitive liner services. For example, if a complete port rotation takes 56 days, a shipping company 246 
will need to assign 8 vessels to achieve a weekly port call frequency. For liner services that operate on 247 
a weekly frequency, weekly route capacity 𝑅𝐶𝑛  in the model equals to the average containership 248 
nominal capacity deployed. Where this is not the case, route capacity across liner services with different 249 
port call frequencies can be standardised to the same time window multiplying the average 250 
containership nominal capacity by a desired capacity time window and the inverse of the service 251 
frequency as follows: 252 
𝑅𝐶𝑛 =  (
∑ 𝑁𝐶
𝑉𝑛
𝑝=1 𝑝𝑛
𝑉𝑛 
) (
𝐹
𝑓𝑛
) (2.9) 
Where 253 
𝑁𝐶𝑝𝑛 Nominal TEU capacity of vessel p deployed in route n 254 
𝑉𝑛  Total number of vessels deployed in route n  255 
𝑝  Index of vessels ranging from 1 to 𝑉𝑛 256 
𝐹  Standardised model input frequency in which the capacity will be expressed 257 
𝑓𝑛  Port call frequency of route n 258 
 259 
It has to be noted that 𝐹 is expressed as the actual number of days (or time window) for the service 260 
frequency in which the route capacities will be standardised. For example, if the route capacities in the 261 
model are standardised to a weekly time window then 𝐹 = (
7 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
1 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘
). The service frequency 𝑓𝑛 can be 262 
given in the input data or replaced by (
𝑇𝑛
𝑉𝑛
) where 𝑇𝑛 represents the total voyage time for the complete 263 
rotation. 264 
3 Problem instance 265 
The model proposed in section 2.2 is applied to representative combined network of five liner services 266 
shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.1. The network was constructed based on existing liner services 267 
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sourced from the Port Operations Research and Technology Centre (PORTeC) Delos Database2 to 268 
assess the vulnerability of ports in Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Port Kelang (Malaysia), 269 
Jakarta/Tanjung Priok and Belawan (Indonesia). Singapore, Port Klang and Belawan operate in close 270 
proximity to the Malacca Straights, which is regarded as one of most crucial maritime routes in the 271 
Southeast Asia-Europe trade lane. The Southeast Asia region and its trade to Europe was selected 272 
because of its high containerised trade flow and the region’s susceptibility to impacts of earthquake and 273 
conflict scenarios presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2. 274 
Liner service calls beyond this region were represented using two port group centroids, namely 275 
Southeast Asia and Europe. The Southeast Asian centroid collectively represents ports located in East 276 
Indonesia, East Indochinese Peninsula, Vietnam and Philippines. Given its location, Tanjung Perak 277 
(second largest port of Indonesia in terms of TEU throughput) was selected to represent the actual 278 
geographical location of the centroid. Jakarta/Tanjung Priok, the main port of Indonesia, has been 279 
considered separately from the group, due to its role as a transhipment hub between Southeast Asia and 280 
routes toward Europe. The European centroids comprise of hubs in Le Havre, Felixstowe, Southampton, 281 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Bremerhaven. In this case, Rotterdam has been adopted as the 282 
physical location of the centroid, given its role as one of the major European transhipment ports.  283 
                                                 
 
2 http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/portoperations/research/research%20platforms/delos  
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 284 
 285 
Figure 3.1: Asia-to-Europe liner services. Nodes: Southeast Asia centroid (A), Singapore (S), 286 
Port Klang (P), Jakarta (J), Belawan (B), Europe centroid (E). 287 
 288 
 289 
 290 
Figure 3.2: Intra-Asian liner services. Nodes: Southeast Asia centroid (A), Singapore (S), Port 291 
Klang (P), Jakarta (J), Belawan (B), Europe centroid (E). 292 
 293 
As shown in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2, services 1, 2 and 5 correspond to weekly Southeast Asia-294 
to-Europe liner services. Vessels in these services fall within the post-panamax range, with an average 295 
cargo carrying capacity of 8,000 TEU. Services 3 and 4 represent intra-regional services, offered weekly 296 
with an average ship size of 4,000 TEU. Vessels across all services in the model are assumed to operate 297 
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at 20 knots. Since all liner services operate on a weekly basis, the maximum weekly route capacity on 298 
each leg equals to the maximum containership nominal capacity deployed on each liner service. 299 
With the exception of Belawan, ports representing the core of the case study network are all 300 
positioned among the top 100 in the world in terms of yearly TEU throughput (Containerisation 301 
International, 2012). Port capacities used in this case study were estimated based on this port throughput 302 
data and the following formulation:  303 
 
𝑘𝑖 =  
𝑛𝑖
𝑁𝑖
𝐾𝑖 (3.1) 
Where 304 
𝑘𝑖  Weekly capacity allocated to the sub-network at port i 305 
𝑛𝑖  Number of weekly liner services within the sub-network to/from port i  306 
𝐾𝑖  Total weekly capacity at port i 307 
𝑁𝑖  Total number of weekly liner services to/from port i 308 
 309 
Equation (3.1) is applied to reflect the weekly capacity allocated to the sub-network under 310 
investigation (data for each port is reported in Table 3.1). No throughput capacity constraints are applied 311 
to the Southeast Asia and Europe nodes given their status as port group centroids. 312 
 313 
Table 3.1: Container handling capacity estimation at network ports. 314 
Port 
𝑲𝒊 
[TEU] 
𝑵𝒊 𝒏𝒊 
𝒌𝒊 
[TEU] 
Singapore 513,000 288 7 14,500 
Port Kelang 163,000 124 5 7,500 
Jakarta 120,000 27 2 9,000 
Belawan 15,500 8 4 7,500 
 315 
For all scenarios presented in sections 3.1 and 3.2, 18,000 TEU are shipped from the Southeast 316 
Asia centroid to the European centroid. External factors that may influence supply and demand were 317 
not considered, therefore leading to the assumption that O-D demand volumes would not be affected 318 
by the disruptions. Container handling, rental and cargo depreciation costs used in the model are in 319 
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accordance to the pricing structures used in previous studies by Bell et al. (2013, 2011). An average 320 
cargo value of USD 40,000 for loaded containers is used in this numerical example. Table 3.2 presents 321 
a summary of these values.  322 
Table 3.2: Container handling, rental and depreciation costs. 323 
Container handling costs 
Loading at origin and unloading at destination 400 USD/TEU 
Loading at origin and unloading at transhipment port 350 USD/TEU 
Loading at transhipment port and unloading at destination 350 USD/TEU 
Loading and unloading at transhipment port  300 USD/TEU 
Rental and depreciation costs 
Average value of cargo shipped per container 40,000 USD/TEU 
Rental cost for full/empty container 4.5 USD/TEU/day 
Rate of depreciation for a full container 20 USD/TEU/day 
 324 
Penalty costs for containers not transported depend on factors such as type of containers (e.g. 325 
refrigerated or dry), the importance of the shipper to the ocean carrier and less quantifiable aspects such 326 
as loss of goodwill from the customer (Brouer et al., 2013). Due to the sensitivity of this information, 327 
previous studies that utilise these cost components are often not able to publish it. In absence of such 328 
data, we adopt Kjeldsen et al. (2011) approach to assign USD 1,000,000 as a penalty cost for each TEU 329 
not transported.  It has to be noted that this high penalty cost is only included in the model to maximise 330 
the flow of containers routed when disruptions reduce network routing capacity below transport 331 
demand. As such, it cannot be used to compare re-routing costs when the penalty cost is incurred. For 332 
the latter cases, we replace the penalty cost with the assumption that ocean carriers assign sufficient 333 
transport capacity to the next available weekly services to transport any pending cargo but incurring a 334 
delay of 7 days. We then apply an opportunity cost of 4% per year (Notteboom, 2006) along with the 335 
cargo depreciation cost and container rental costs defined in Table 3.2 to estimate the delay costs.  336 
3.1 Earthquake scenario 337 
For the earthquake scenario, we consider the seismic hazard at a port (probability of a certain level of 338 
ground shaking) and the vulnerability of the port (likelihood of damage to the port due to ground 339 
shaking). In many international building codes, the seismic hazard to be considered in the design of 340 
earthquake-resistant structures is defined as a level of ground shaking with a 2% probability of 341 
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exceedance in 50 years (a 2475 year return period).  The level of ground shaking is measured using 342 
spectral acceleration (SA).  Spectral acceleration with a 1 second period (S1) is roughly equivalent to 343 
peak ground acceleration (PGA).  The values for the ports in the network are obtained from the United 344 
States Geological Survey Worldwide Seismic Design Maps (USGS, 2014a). The vulnerability of ports 345 
is measured using a Quality of Port Infrastructure rating, which measures business executives' 346 
perceptions of their country's port facilities. The rating ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating 347 
better development of port infrastructure.  These data are obtained from the Global Earthquake Model 348 
(GEM) report on socio-economic vulnerability indicators for earthquake impacts (Power et al., 2013). 349 
The earthquake scenario was developed using the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake impacts on the 350 
Port of Kobe as a case study.  According to the USGS, the Port of Kobe experienced a PGA = 0.315g  351 
(Chang, 1996). USGS data indicate that the vulnerability of ports rating in Japan is 5.2. It should be 352 
noted that this rating is from 2014 and port vulnerability in Japan in 1995 may have been higher (<5.2) 353 
and earthquake impacts resulted in considerable improvements to port infrastructure to reduce 354 
vulnerability to earthquakes.  The port accounted for 10% of Japan’s import and export trade and 355 
handled 30% of Japan's container cargo throughput. The port was particularly important for Western 356 
Japan as it handled roughly 65% of imports and exports for Kinki, Hyogo and Chugoku and 80% of 357 
exports from Shikoku.  After the earthquake struck, the port was virtually closed.  The first berth for 358 
container traffic reopened 2 months after the event and by April, the total trade amounted to only 40% 359 
of the previous year.  Cargo traffic was diverted to alternative ports, where the main beneficiaries were 360 
domestic ports with 50% of container cargo rerouted to Yokohama and 40% to Tokyo and Osaka. 361 
In the port network presented in this paper, two earthquake scenarios similar in impacts to the 1995 362 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake are possible, affecting the ports of Jakarta or Belawan.  An earthquake in 363 
Jakarta or Belawan with a 2475 year return period has a spectral acceleration, S1 = 0.33g (USGS, 2014a, 364 
2014b). Using the conversion equations of Worden et al. (2012), this gives a Modified Mercalli 365 
Intensity3 (MMI) scale of 7.7. Jakarta could therefore experience ground-shaking of a similar level to 366 
                                                 
 
3 The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale depicts shaking severity. Source: 
http://quake.abag.ca.gov/shaking/mmi/  
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that experienced in Kobe.  Jakarta is rated as more vulnerable in the GEM study than Japanese ports 367 
(GEM rating = 3.6) and could potentially suffer more damage and therefore take longer to rebuild than 368 
the Port of Kobe, increasing recovery time to return the port to its normal operations. Figure 3.4 provide 369 
a geographical representation of Southeast Asian ports and regional PGA values. 370 
 371 
Figure 3.3: Earthquake hazard (PGA) - Southeast Asia. 372 
Source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies 373 
 374 
The impact of accidents resulting in loss of human life, injuries, damages to property and to the 375 
environment in the aftermath of an earthquake vary on a case-by-case basis depending on multiple 376 
factors such as magnitude of the earthquake, port infrastructure, stacking plan of containers, level of 377 
automation, etc. The unforeseen nature of any earthquake also increases the risk of accidents. For 378 
example terminal gantry crane or reach stacker operators maybe injured or killed if stacked containers 379 
fall near or on them due to the unexpected ground shacking. Similarly, potential of tsunami waves 380 
generated by the earthquake can capsize moored vessels or break their mooring during container/load 381 
discharge operations.  382 
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Caselli et al. (2014) list and classify observed risk factors that impacted port operations and 383 
surrounding areas in Iquique, Chile after the April 1, 2014 earthquake. These include structural damage 384 
to port infrastrucure such as the breakwater wall (building damage), blocking of access routes due to 385 
landslides (transportation facilities), shortage of water and electricity (lifeline facilities), loss of one of 386 
three available tugboats (transportation facilities), psychological impact due to large amounts of 387 
aftershocks (life difficulties), human suffering due to death or injured people (human suffering), damage 388 
to fishing boats and facilities (other facilities). Similarly, Kubo et al. (2005) review of impacts of 389 
tsunamis on moored ships and ports in Japan and Korea listing potential sources of accident and damage 390 
hazards. The latter include landing of the drifting material produced by the tsunami, fire or pollution 391 
caused by fuel in vehicles and vessels crashed, ship collisions during habour escape attempts, sand drift, 392 
waterway burying, and stranding and ceasing of logistics functions. 393 
For modelling purposes, a suggested level of disruption is similar to that experienced in 1995 at 394 
the Port of Kobe. The potential sources accidents and damage mentioned above are considered in the 395 
aftermath of the Jakarta and Belawan earthquake scenarios and are captured in the following estimated 396 
recovery times: the port of Jakarta or the port of Belawan are estimated to be closed for container cargo 397 
for 2 months (equivalent to the Kobe disruption).  After 3 months, 40% of available port container 398 
handling capacity is restored.  The system is expected to recover fully after 1 year (with 100% of original 399 
capacity being available). 400 
3.2 War scenario 401 
Developing a war scenario involved historical analysis, the assessment of current “areas of tension”, 402 
and consideration of current military theory and recent war-gaming exercises.  The hypothetical China-403 
Japan war scenario builds on historical tensions and geographical disputes. Claims of sovereignty of 404 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and the targeting of naval assets triggers the conflict. 405 
Direct action on either country is limited, although military targets in China and Japan’s power 406 
infrastructure are targeted in missile strikes.  One of the areas most affected, and the focal point of this 407 
study, is the impact on shipping.  408 
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The impact of accidents resulting in loss of human life, injuries, damages to property in a war 409 
scenario can be evaluated from historical evidence of merchant shipping in areas of political conflict. 410 
For example, Navias and Hooton (1996) present a detailed account of the impact of the Iran-Iraq Crisis 411 
of 1980-88 on merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. The toll of this war were hundreds of merchant 412 
vessels attacked, more than 400 mariners killed, and economic losses worth millions of USD by owners, 413 
charterers and insurance companies (Navias and Hooton, 1996). Even though the main targets were oil 414 
tankers, about 40% of the vessels attacked were containerships, bulk carriers, tugs and others (Uhlig, 415 
1997). An important aspect of the Iran-Iraq Crisis attacks were their effectiveness at disrupting exports 416 
and supply lines of the involved countries proving the vulnerability of neutral-flag merchant vessels 417 
operating in war or blockade zones. However, an often overlooked fact is the possibility of conflict 418 
escalation when such attacks on neutral-flag vessels provide context for international intervention of 419 
naval forces from countries not initially involved. For example, Uhlig (1997) describe how in the Iran-420 
Iraq Crisis, the U.S. used its own registry flag to protect Kuwait’s merchant fleet with U.S. naval forces.  421 
For our war scenario, an initial naval blockade surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disrupts 422 
shipping routes through the East China Sea (Figure 3.4 – B1). The potential risks for loss of life, 423 
accidents, and economic damage and escalation are assumed to be similar to the Iraq-Iran Crisis. As the 424 
conflict escalates, the blockade zone increases to an area including Taiwan and the southern part of 425 
Kyushu and Shikoku islands (Figure 3.4 – B2). As other nations become involved in a naval standoff, 426 
the blockade zone expands further, encompassing access to China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam through 427 
the South China Sea (Figure 3.4 – B3). Additional threats to merchant vessels include the use naval 428 
mines to protect any exclusion or blockade zone, which present a risk of vessels straying into non 429 
designated or known waters. Environmental risks include hypothetical oil spills from damaged vessels. 430 
These risks are represented in our model as disrupted connectivity in the form of increased sailing times, 431 
reduced transport capacity and increased costs to and from the Asia centroid. 432 
In this extreme scenario, where the conflict lasts 9 months, and takes a further 3 months to manage 433 
the stand-down of forces, international trading is severely restricted: foreign direct investment decreases 434 
by 70% and imports and exports suffer 90% reduction for the belligerent nations.  While the main ports 435 
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of Southeast Asia (Kaohsiung, Tokyo, Busan, Shanghai, and Hong Kong), would maintain almost full 436 
capacity through the conflict, the level of activity would be minimal. Manufacturing organisations, 437 
particularly foreign-owned entities in China and Japan, would halt operations, through political 438 
pressure, safety concerns, or because exporting became impossible as container yards fill due to the 439 
blockades. In spite of not being located in the conflict zone, container throughput at the port of 440 
Singapore and other regional transhipment hubs may be severely impacted also due to containers 441 
accumulated in the yards as cargo traffic to/from the conflict zone is blocked.  442 
 443 
 444 
Figure 3.4: War scenario blockade regions. 445 
Source: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies 446 
 447 
Table 3.3 summarizes four alternative outcomes of the earthquake and war scenarios are 448 
developed. As shown in the table, the consequences of these disruptive events are modelled not only by 449 
reducing the capacity of ports, but also affecting the route capacity on legs involving the disrupted port 450 
and the costs of shipping through those routes. Transit times to and from disrupted ports are assumed 451 
P. Achurra-Gonzalez, M. Novati, R. Foulser-Piggott, D.J. Graham, G. Bowman, M.G.H. Bell, P. Angeloudis     22 
 
 
 
to be increased by 300% immediately after the events and by 100% 2 months after. Resulting changes 452 
to route capacity in the scenarios evaluated are estimated using equation (2.9). Except for the war 453 
scenario, container handling capacity is reduced to 0% immediately after the events and to 40% 3 454 
months after. 455 
 456 
 457 
Table 3.3: Summary of scenarios and related parameters 458 
ID Scenario Event time-frame Capacity changes 
0 Base scenario None all ports and routes working at 
standard operational level 
1 Earthquake in Jakarta 
 
a) Immediately after the event 
 
 
 
b) 3 months after the event 
0% port capacity in J 
+300% sailing time to/from J 
-16% capacity in Service 2 
-46% capacity in Service 4 
40% port capacity in J 
+100% sailing time to/from J 
-3% capacity in Service 2 
-12.5% capacity in Service 4 
2 Earthquake in Belawan a) Immediately after the event 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 3 months after the event 
0% port capacity in B 
+300% sailing time to/from B 
-17% capacity in Service 1 
-70% capacity in Service 3 
-39% capacity in Service 4 
-18% capacity in Service 5 
40% port capacity 
+100% sailing time to/from B 
-5% capacity in Service 1 
-46% capacity in Service 3 
-7% capacity in Service 4 
-7% capacity in Service 5 
3 Earthquake involving Jakarta 
and Belawan simultaneously 
a) Immediately after the event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 2 months after the event 
 
 
0% port capacity in J and B 
+300% sailing time to/from J and B 
-17% capacity in Service 1 
-16% capacity in Service 2 
-70% capacity in Service 3 
-56% capacity in Service 4 
-18% capacity in Service 5 
40% port capacity in J and B 
+100% sailing time to/from J,B 
-5% capacity in Service 1 
-3% capacity in Service 2 
-46% capacity in Service 3 
-22% capacity in Service 4 
-7% capacity in Service 5 
4 War affecting flows in 
Southeast Asia 
a) Severe consequences 
 
+300% sailing time to/from A 
-17% capacity in Service 1 
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ID Scenario Event time-frame Capacity changes 
 
 
 
b) Mild consequences 
-16% capacity in Service 2 
-53% capacity in Service 3 
-30% capacity in Service 4 
+100% sailing time to/from A 
-17% capacity in Service 1 
-16% capacity in Service 2 
-53% capacity in Service 3 
-30% capacity in Service 4 
 459 
3.3 Application of the cost-based container assignment model  460 
The cost-based container assignment model defined in section 2.2 was implemented IBM’s OPL 461 
language and solved using the CPLEX optimisation engine to evaluate how each scenario stand to affect 462 
(or not) the routing of container in the constructed network. Resulting container flows and costs are 463 
reported in Table 3.4. In the base scenario, it can be seen that, under normal transport network 464 
conditions, the transport demand of 18,000 TEU from Southeast Asia to Europe can be normally 465 
satisfied by two services with direct connection to Europe (Services 1 and 2) and transhipment services 466 
connecting through in Port Klang (Service 3 connecting to Service 5). The total routing cost of this base 467 
scenario is USD 21.7 million.  468 
A hypothetical earthquake in Jakarta (Scenario 1a) disrupts the network by increasing transit times 469 
in Services 2 and 4 which reduces route capacity as shipping companies do not have time to deploy 470 
additional vessels in order to compensate for the voyage time elongation immediately after the event. 471 
The increase of transhipment through Port Klang surpases its available port throughput capacity and 472 
the excess container flows are then re-routed through Singapore. The additional cost to route 18,000 473 
TEU from Southeast Asia to Europe is USD 2.7 million (+12.5%) over the base scenario. Two months 474 
after the disruption (Scenario 1b), port capacity is improved to 40% and liner service capacity in 475 
services calling in Jakarta is significantly restored. Additional disruptions routing costs at this stage of 476 
the recovery are USD 1.0 million (+4.7%) over the base scenario. The improvement is the result of 477 
reduced transshipment flows through Port Klang. 478 
Similarly, an earthquake in Belawan (Scenario 2a) resulting in complete disruption of its container 479 
terminal affects route capacity in services 1, 3, 4 and 5. The route capacity reductions  increase the use 480 
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of transshipment alternatives through Port Klang and Singapore which elevate routing costs by USD 481 
3.0 million (+13.9%). Two months after the disruption (Scenario 2b), with port capacity restored to 482 
40% and affected route capacity significantly restored, increased routing costs are reduced to USD 1.0 483 
million (+4.7%) above the base scenario by replacing transshipment flows through Singapore with more 484 
direct shipments using services 1 and 2. 485 
If Jakarta and Belawan are disrupted simultaneously by a major earthquake (Scenario 3a), all liner 486 
services in the network are impacted resulting in a reduction of outbound capacity at the Southeast Asia 487 
centroid to 16,319 TEU. This large-scale impact makes unfeasible to meet the weekly transport demand 488 
of 18,000 TEU through the network. The remaining 1,681 TEU incur a 7 day delay as described in 489 
section 3 resulting in a additional delay cost of USD 340,066 for the containers not routed in the first 490 
solution instance. The total routing cost increase is USD 6.3 million (+29.0%) over the base scenario.  491 
Two months after the disruption (Scenario 3b), both ports are restored to 40% and liner service 492 
outbound capacity at the Asia centroid is restored to more than 20,000 TEU and the total outbound 493 
demand can be shipped in one solution instance. These improvements reduce additional routing costs 494 
to USD 2.1 million (+9.8%). 495 
In scenario 4a, a blockade resulting from a potential political conflict increases sailing time to and 496 
from the Southeast Asia centroid by 300%. Such increase reduces available outbound weekly capacity 497 
and incresases more expensive transhipment alternatives through Singapore and Port Klang. The 498 
resulting cost increase of the blockade is USD 3.1 million (+14.6%). As the regional blockade is reduced 499 
(Scenario 4b), transit time to and from Southeast Asia is increases by 100% and transshipment is 500 
required only through Port Klang. Resulting cost increase is then reduced to USD 1.3 Million (+6.0%). 501 
As summarized in Table 3.4, variations in total costs from the base scenario range from +4.7% in 502 
scenario 1b to +29.0% in scenario 3a. Across all liner services, service 3 is the most affected by the 503 
disruptions evaluated due to its greater percentage gains in transit times over regional voyages 504 
suggesting that intra-regional connectivity would be more susceptible to disruptions. 505 
  506 
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Table 3.4: Cost-based model scenario results 507 
Scenario 0 – Total Cost: $ 21,725,800 
  Origin Destination Flow Service    
    [TEUs] n.    
  Asia Europe 8000 1    
  Asia Europe 8000 2    
  Asia Port Klang 2000 3    
  Port Klang Europe 2000 5    
Scenario 1a - Total Cost: $ 24,439,538 (+12.5%)  Scenario 1b - Total Cost: $ 22,738,616 (+4.7%) 
Asia Europe 8000 1  Asia Europe 8000 1 
Asia Europe 6000 2  Asia Europe 7754 2 
Port Klang Europe 625 2  Asia Singapore 2246 3 
Asia Singapore 250 3  Singapore Europe 2246 5 
Asia Port Klang 3750 3      
Singapore Europe 250 5      
Port Klang Europe 3125 5      
Scenario 2a – Total Cost: $ 24,738,643 (+13.9%)  Scenario 2b – Total Cost: $ 22,768,763 (+4.8%) 
Asia Singapore 3220 1  Asia Europe 7636 1 
Asia Europe 3412 1  Asia Europe 8000 2 
Asia Europe 8000 2  Asia Port Klang 2154 3 
Asia Port Klang 1217 3  Asia Port Klang 210 4 
Asia Port Klang 2151 4  Port Klang Europe 2364 5 
Singapore Europe 3220 5      
Port Klang Europe 3368 5      
Scenario 3a – Total Cost: $ 28,034,207 (+29.0%)  Scenario 3b – Total Cost: $ 23,857,285 (+9.8%) 
Asia Singapore 4085 1  Asia Europe 7636 1 
Asia Europe 3011 1  Asia Europe 7754 2 
Port Klang Europe 87 1  Asia Port Klang 2154 3 
Asia Europe 6720 2  Asia Port Klang 456 4 
Port Klang Europe 87 2  Port Klang Europe 2610 5 
Asia Port Klang 2967 3      
Asia Singapore 608 3      
Asia Port Klang 1750 4      
Port Klang Europe 18000 5      
Singapore Europe 9386 5      
Scenario 4a – Total Cost: $ 24,894,877 (+14.6%)  Scenario 4b – Total Cost: $ 23,028,490 (+6.0%)   
Asia Europe 6632 1  Asia Europe 7412 1 
Asia Europe 6720 2  Asia Europe 7754 2 
Asia Singapore 1900 3  Asia Port Klang 2154 3 
Asia Port Klang 2748 4  Asia Port Klang 680 4 
Singapore Europe 1900 5  Port Klang Europe 2834 5 
Port Klang Europe 2748 5      
 508 
4 Conclusions and future work 509 
The main contribution of this paper is the application of a cost-based container assignment methodology 510 
for assessing the vulnerability of a multi-port system against natural and man-made disruptions. 511 
Changes to route and port capacity parameters allow to capture potential effects to the network on the 512 
aftermath of port disruptions while a penalty cost extension to previous model formulations allows 513 
feasible solutions even when capacity is diminished below transport demands. The virtual network 514 
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approach used in the model allows to skip disrupted ports within liner services. The latter is a common 515 
measure taken by ocean carriers to mitigate the financial impacts on their established services. The 516 
feasibility of solutions for instances of network routing capacities below transport demands and the 517 
ability to skip disrupted ports are desired capabilities of a suitable methodology for the analysis of 518 
container routing in disruptive scenarios.  519 
Calibration and numerical applications of the model were carried translating historical data on 520 
previous events and hazard forecasts into operational functionality disruptions and recovery intervals 521 
for two cases of port disruptions: seismic hazard and political conflicts. For these disruption cases, the 522 
Southeast Asia to Europe corridor was investigated as case study trade lane due to its global strategic 523 
importance in terms of cargo volume and potential consequences from a chain effect of failures. Results 524 
suggested higher susceptibility of the intra-regional connectivity and demonstrated the applicability of 525 
the cost-based assignment model to improve the understanding of cargo re-routing and operational cost 526 
impacts in the scenarios evaluated. Changes in parameters such as sources of disruption, structure of 527 
network services, O-D flow pairs, functional impacts, recovery intervals and operational costs extend 528 
the applicability of this model to a wider range of port disruption cases discussed in the literature such 529 
as labour strikes, operational accidents, terrorist attacks, and port congestions providing a quantitative 530 
framework for their analysis. 531 
Due to its exemplifying purpose, the network instance used in the scenarios presented make large 532 
use of secondary data, leaving room for further refinements in selection of data sources and calibration 533 
inputs. Such future data improvements are supported by the linear program approach used in the 534 
proposed formulation of this study which allows extensions of the model to wider more-realistic 535 
networks while still allowing the problem to be efficiently solvable with commercially available 536 
solvers. The cost minimisation formulation in the model may also be replaced in future applications by 537 
a profit maximisation or a cargo prioritisation approach to allow for cases where certain cargo must be 538 
routed first in a network incapable of transporting all O-D flows. Examples of such cases include 539 
humanitarian relief goods or high value cargoes prioritised over less valuable shipments.   540 
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A fully developed application of the container assignment model (e.g. including empty container 541 
repositioning and liner network design capabilities) could provide shipping lines and logistics providers 542 
with a tool for the evaluation of hazardous events, allowing them to estimate the operational and 543 
financial consequences of cargo flow redistributions. Accident analysis at container terminals that 544 
benefit from sudden surges in cargo from disrupted ports could also help improve the understanding 545 
and modelling of connected risks of port disruptions. Additional applications may help policy-makers 546 
in evaluating the robustness of networks and the associated strategic importance of container terminals, 547 
supporting decision making processes and orientating investments on port infrastructures.  548 
Successful applications in a resilience context could then be extended to evaluate the effects of 549 
other relevant large-scale perturbations to the liner shipping industry such as new infrastructure 550 
developments or environmental-driven changes. For the latter purpose, this study has also proposed a 551 
classification scheme of maritime network perturbations in order to identify events beyond port 552 
disruptions that could alter relevant parameters in liner shipping operations where applications of the 553 
cost-based assignment model or similar methodologies can be used as decision support tools. 554 
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Appendix: Model notation 651 
 652 
Sets Subsets Indices 
𝐴  Legs 
𝑂  Origin ports 
𝐷  Destination ports 
𝐼  All ports  
𝑁  All routes  
𝐿  All links  
𝑇  Leg types  
 
𝐴𝑖
+ Legs entering port i 
𝐴𝑖
− Legs entering port i 
𝐴𝑛 Legs on route n 
𝐴𝑛
𝑡  Legs on route n 
𝐿𝑛 Links on route n 
 
 
𝑎  for legs 
𝑖  for ports 
𝑙  for links 
𝑛  for routes 
𝑟  for origin ports 
𝑠  for destination ports  
𝑡  for leg types 
 
Parameters 653 
𝑐𝑎   Sailing time on leg a, including loading and loading times at the ends 654 
𝐶𝐻𝐶𝑛 Container handling cost for route 𝑛 655 
𝐶𝑅  Rental cost per unit time per container 656 
𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑟𝑠 Total demand of full containers to be transported from origin r to destination s 657 
𝐷𝑉  Depreciation per unit time per full container (inventory cost) 658 
δ𝑎𝑙𝑛 1 if leg a uses link l on route n, and 0 otherwise 659 
𝑓𝑎   Frequency of sailing on leg a 660 
𝑘𝑖  Maximum throughput capacity at port 𝑖 661 
𝑃𝐶 Penalty cost for full containers not transported  662 
𝑅𝐶𝑛 Capacity of route n 663 
 664 
Decision variables 665 
𝑡𝑟𝑠
𝑓
  Flow of full containers from origin r to destination s 666 
𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓
  Flow of full containers on leg a en route to destination s 667 
𝑤𝑖𝑠
𝑓
  Expected dwell time at port i for all full containers en route to destination s 668 
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 669 
Leg types 𝑇  are origin-to-destination (o-d); origin-to-transhipment (o-t); transhipment-to-670 
transhipment (t-t); and transhipment-to-destination (t-d). The following conventions are used to 671 
simplify the notation (Bell et al., 2013): 𝑥𝑎+
𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑎𝑠
𝑓
𝑠∈𝐷  , 𝑤++
𝑓 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑠
𝑓
𝑠∈𝐷𝑖∈𝐼  , 𝑡+𝑠
𝑓 =  ∑ 𝑡𝑟𝑠
𝑓
𝑟∈𝑂 .  672 
 673 
